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I. INTRODUCTION
This article compares some of the salient features of the
Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) with the corre-
sponding provisions of the American Uniform Commercial Code
(uCC).
The Commission on European Contract Law (the Commis-
sion) began its work in 1982. The scope of the work is the gen-
eral principles of contract law. The Commission first prepared
rules on performance, non-performance (breach) of contracts
and remedies for non-performance. Part 1 of the PECL was
published in 1995.2
In 1992, the Second Commission on European Contract
Law began working on the formation, validity, interpretation
and contents of contracts, as well as on the authority of an
agent to bind his principal. The Second Commission held its
last meeting in May 1996, and subsequently published the
PECL Parts I and II in 1999. 3 Like the American Restatements
of the Law, the articles are accompanied by comments explain-
ing the operation of the articles as well as notes indicating the
sources of the rules and any corresponding rules of the Member
States. A third Commission is presently working on various
matters including assignment of claims and debts, set-off, and
prescription.
The members of the three Commissions are primarily aca-
demics, many of whom are practicing lawyers. They are inde-
pendent and are not representatives of specific political or
governmental interests. They all pursue the same objective,
i.e., to draft the most appropriate contract rules for Europe.
The main purpose of the PECL is to serve as a first draft of
a part of the European Civil Code. However, before the Code is
enacted it may serve purposes other than that of a Code. It may
have objectives similar to those of the American Restatements
2 See COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW. PRINCIPLES OF EuRoPEAN
CONTRACT LAw, PART 1: PERFORMANCE, NON-PERFORMANCE AND REMEDIES (Ole
Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 1995)
3 See COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAw, PARTS I & II (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 1999).
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of the Law,4 which are non-binding ways of unifying American
law. A national court may apply the Restatements when the
law is unsettled, or when the court chooses to deviate from the
rules of that law. When deciding cases involving contracts, the
European Court sometimes needs general principles of contract
law common to Member States of the European Union (EU).
Furthermore, lawmakers of the European Community have is-
sued and are preparing directives regulating specific contracts. 5
These directives, however, are not well coordinated. For one
thing, there is no current legal infrastructure to support such
specific measures. The PECL could serve as a matrix to help
make the directives more coherent.
Together with the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts6 (UNIDROIT Principles), the PECL will
serve as a guideline for countries wishing to legislate. Several
of the former socialist countries in Eastern and Central Europe
are consulting these two sets of principles.
Finally, parties to an international contract may wish to
have their contract governed by a "neutral" set of rules instead
of by national law. Arbitrators deciding commercial disputes
between parties from different European Community (EC)
countries may apply the PECL or the UNIDROIT Principles.
This may also be done when the parties have agreed to have
their contract governed by "general principles of law," the lex
mercatoria, or the like.7 When drafting international standard
form contracts for European or global use, parties may need bal-
anced terms that take account of the interests of both parties.
In such circumstances, the parties may refer to the PECL.
The European Parliament favors a Code. Believing that
legislation is necessary, the European Parliament passed reso-
lutions in 1989 and again in 1994 requesting the commence-
ment of preparatory work on the drafting of a European Code of
Private Law.8 The preamble to the first resolution, stated that
"unification can be carried out in branches of private law which
4 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. (1981).
5 See LANDO & BEALE, supra note 3, at xxiii.
6 See International Institute for the Unification of Private Law Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (Rome: UNIDROIT, 1994) [hereinafter
UNIDROIT Principles].
7 See LANDO & BEALE, supra note 3, at xxiv.
8 See id. at xxiii.
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are highly important for the development of a Single Market,
such as contract law."
9
On July 11, 2001 the European Commission published a
Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on
European Contract Law (COM(2001) 398 final) (Communica-
tion). Foremost in consideration in the Communication is the
position to be adopted in relation to "problems for the function-
ing of the internal market resulting from the co-existence of dif-
ferent national contract laws." In the Communication, the
European Commission has invited responses from govern-
ments, institutions, professional organizations, universities,
and experts in the field of European legal studies. The Euro-
pean Commission mentions and invites comments on various
options, which the EU could adopt. One is to develop and pro-
mote a Restatement that, like the American Restatements of
the Law, is "soft law." Another is the adoption of comprehen-
sive and binding Community legislation in the field of contract
law. As of December 2001 the Commission continued to receive
answers to the Communication.
II. FEATURES OF TECHNIQUE AND STYLE
A. Simplicity of Language
The Swiss Code has many of the scholarly qualities of the
German Civil Code (BGB) but is not burdened by the scientific
character of the BGB. Like the Swiss, the Commission did not
attempt completeness; in many topics it gave only an outline.
Thus, there are eight articles in the BGB on contracts for the
benefits of third parties, two in the Swiss Obligationenrecht and
one in the PECL.1°
Accuracy and comprehensibility are important, but some-
times mutually incompatible. Accuracy may burden the text
and make it difficult to understand. If, on the other hand, you
strive at comprehensibility, the text may lose it's accuracy.
However, the text should be drafted so that a person who can
read and grasp an abstraction will understand the PECL fairly
easily. The words of the author of the Swiss Civil Code, Eugen
9 Resolution of 26 May 1989 OJEC No. C 158/401; Resolution of 6 May 1994
OJEC No. C 205/519.
10 Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 4.
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Huber were in the minds of the Commission when drafting the
PECL. According to Huber, the Code "must speak in popular
ideas. The man of reason who has thought about his times and
their needs should have the feeling as he reads it that the stat-
ute speaks to him from the heart .... Its provisions must mean
something to the educated layman."" The parts of the Swiss
Civil Code that were prepared by Huber follow the principles
that a legal text should have short sentences, short paragraphs
and articles with few paragraphs. The Commission tried its
best to achieve these goals.
While English was the primary language, one had to con-
sider that the texts were going to be translated into other lan-
guages. The Commission learned from the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
1980 (CISG) the value of using factual language instead of legal
terms. Factual language is easier to understand and to trans-
late. The Commission tried to avoid expressions that have a
specific legal meaning in the English common law. For in-
stance, it used the term non-performance instead of breach of
contract.
Some statutes contain numerous and large lists of defini-
tions. The UCC is one example. The Commission was of the
opinion that, though they may provide accuracy, many defini-
tions make the texts difficult to read and understand and make
the rules inflexible. The Commission, therefore tried to avoid
many definitions. 12
B. Rules rich in implications
The French legislator Jean ]ttienne Marie Portalis, in his
Discours Preliminaire (1799), said that the articles of the
French Civil Code should be written as broad principles that
may cover many situations and may comprise new develop-
"I HUBER, SCHWEIZERISCHES CIVILGESETZBUCH, ERLAUTERUNGEN ZUM
VORENTWURF 2.12 (1902), quoting Konrad ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION
TO COMPARATrvE LAw, 172 (Oxford 3d ed. 1998).
12 See, e.g., PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:301 includes the meanings of: "act,"
which includes omissions; "intentional act," which includes reckless acts; " court,"
which includes arbitral tribunal; "non-performance" (breach) of a contract; "mate-
rial" matter; and "written" statements; PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:302 defines "rea-
sonableness;" PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:209(4) defines the expression "general
conditions of contract."
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ments in society. As Portalis, the Commission realized that
times will change and that the rules should give room for an
application that takes new developments into consideration.
The Commission had confidence in the judges and the arbitra-
tors who are to apply the PECL. PECL Article 1:106 provides
for the interpretation and supplementation of the PECL. PECL
Article 1:106(1) lays down that "these Principles should be in-
terpreted and developed in accordance with their purposes."
PECL Article 1:106(2) provides as CISG Article 7(2), that issues
which are within the scope of the PECL, but not expressly set-
tled by them are to be settled in accordance with the ideas un-
derlying the PECL as far as possible.
The UCC section 1-102(1) provides that the Act "shall be
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying pur-
poses and policies." Among the underlying purposes and policies
listed in UCC section 1-102 (2) are:
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commer-
cial transactions:
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
The rules governing the interpretation and development of the
UCC are not very different from those governing the PECL.
III. SALIENT FEATURES OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PECL
A. Freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda
1. You shall keep your contract
A basic principle in the laws of all countries is to keep your
contract. The legislators and courts stick to this with vigor. A
contracting party must be able to rely on the contract and exer-
cise the freedom and rights granted to it under the contract.
While the pacta sunt servanda rule is found in the UNIDROIT
Principles, the Commission considered it so obvious that it did
not state it in a special rule. It is, however, implied in several
articles, including PECL Article 1:102(1), which provides that
the "parties are free to enter into a contract and to determine its
contents," and PECL Article 6:111, which provides that "a party
is bound to fulfill its obligations even if performance becomes
more onerous."
[Vol. 13:339
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Most of the provisions of the PECL are non-mandatory.
PECL Article 1:102(1) provides that the parties may determine
the contents of their contract "subject to the requirements of
good faith and fair dealing, and the mandatory rules estab-
lished by these Principles." PECL Article 1:102(2) lays down
that "the parties may exclude the application of any of the Prin-
ciples or derogate from or vary their effects, except as otherwise
provided by these Principles." UCC section 1-102(3) lays down
very similar rules.
2. You shall keep your promise
There is consistency among the laws that an agreement
only becomes a binding contract if the parties have intended to
become legally bound. A dinner invitation is morally but not
legally binding. Furthermore, the parties must have agreed on
terms that are sufficiently definite. This rule seems to be ac-
cepted in the laws of the Member States and is stipulated in
PECL Article 2:101.13 There are, however, other problems: Is a
party bound by a promise that he intended to be binding but is
not supported by consideration? Can a party revoke its offer
before it has been accepted?
The Commission found that in business there are promises
that should be enforced even though there was no consideration
in the English meaning of the word. An example of this is a
promise to pay for work or services already completed or agreed
upon. The same applies with respect to promises to make a gift
or donation. Why should a wealthy American industrialist of
Croatian descent not be bound by a promise he made in public
to pay one million dollars into a fund for the benefit of wives
and children of Croatian soldiers killed in the war between Cro-
atia and Serbia in the late 1990's?
Furthermore, the promisor should in general be bound even
though there was no "bargained for" consideration. In fact, the
English courts have had problems with their doctrine of consid-
eration and have tempered it by relying on commercial usages,
13 Articles in Part 1 cited with a period (.) after the chapter, e.g., Art. 2.117,
follow the old numbering, while those with a colon (:, e.g., Art. 2:201) follow the
new numbering. The old numbering is changed in Part 2.
2001]
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estoppel and "invented consideration" to avoid some of the hard-
ships arising under the doctrine. 14
For these reasons the Commission followed the continental
rule that does not require consideration. PECL Article 2:107
provides that "a promise which is intended to be legally binding
without acceptance is binding." PECL Article 2:101(1) provides
that "a contract is concluded if: (a) the parties intend to be le-
gally bound, and (b) they reach a sufficient agreement without
any further requirement." This passage disposes of considera-
tion and of formal requirements. It is in accordance with CISG
Article 11 and the laws of the United Kingdom, Germany and
the Nordic Countries that do not require any form.15
As for the second question, whether a party can revoke an
offer before it has been accepted, the Commission decided that a
party may revoke its offer as long as the offeree has not ac-
cepted.1 6 However, proposals which the offeror has designated
as irrevocable and offers specifying a fixed time for acceptance,
create an expectation on the part of the offeree that they will
not be revoked. 17 This expectation should be protected. Simi-
larly, if it is "reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as
being irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the
offer,"' 8 it should not be revocable. For instance, if a contractor
asks a perspective sub-contractor to submit an offer to be used
in the contractor's bid for a construction contract, the sub-con-
tractor should not be permitted to revoke his offer.
PECL Article 2:202(3) takes these considerations into ac-
count by providing that the:
revocation of an offer is ineffective if: (a) the offer indicates that it
is irrevocable; or (b) states a fixed time for its acceptance; or (c) it
14 See ROYSTON GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW 74 (2d ed. 1995) (for promises induc-
ing non-requested reliance and abstract payment undertakings, such as letters of
credit and on-demand guarantees); GUENTER TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 67
(London 10th ed., 1999) (for cases involving "invented" consideration); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS § 2.2 (Vol. 1, 1990) (for the American theory of
consideration).
15 Compare U.C.C. § 2-201 regarding the formal requirements of the Statute
of Frauds.
16 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2.202(1).
17 See id. art. 2.202(3)(c).
18 Id.
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was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevo-
cable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer.
In this respect, PECL Article 2:202 follows CISG Article 16,
however, with one important modification. CISG Article
16(2)(a) provides that an offer cannot be revoked "if it indicates,
whether by stating a fixed time for its acceptance or otherwise,
that it is irrevocable." A reader who is unfamiliar with the
background of this provision could believe that specifying the
time for the acceptance of an offer would always make it irrevo-
cable; however, this was not the intention of all the delegates
who drafted CISG Article 16 in Vienna in 1980. The common
law delegates would not agree with the civil law delegates, that
an offer would automatically become irrevocable by stating a
time for acceptance. Although the outcome of their debate is
not very clear, it appears that the question whether an offer is
irrevocable depends on the intention of the offeror as it was rea-
sonably understood by the offeree. In contracts between parties
having their place of business in a civil law country, any specifi-
cation of the time for acceptance will generally make the offer
irrevocable. On the other hand, contracts between parties from
a common law country are generally revocable, if they only
specify when the offer lapses and may no longer be accepted. In
contracts where an offeree on the Continent receives such an
offer from an offeror in a common law country, the offer will be
treated as revocable, 19 if it can be proven that the offeree knew
or could not have been unaware of the fact that the offeror's
intention was to keep the offer revocable.
Since the rule in CISG Article 16(2)(a) may cause uncer-
tainty, it was not adopted by the Commission. Under PECL Ar-
ticle 2:202(3)(b), any specification of the time for the offer's
acceptance will make it irrevocable.
Compared with the rules on revocation of an offer in the
UCC, PECL Article 2:202(3)(a) resembles that of the firm offer
19 See CISG art. 8 on the interpretation of a party's intention; DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES, 280, 307, 374, 499 (Hon-
nold ed., 1989)(for a discussion of Art. 16(1)(a) and its genesis); see also E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 95 (Bianca &
Bonell eds., 1987); PETER SCHLECHTRIEM in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN
KAUFRECHT No. 141 (von Cammerer & Schlechtriem eds., 2d ed. 1995); UNIDROIT
Principles, supra note 6, at art. 2.4, which contains the same rule as CISG Art.
16(2)(a).
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in UCC section 2-205. However, the promise not to revoke does
not have to be in writing and separately signed by the offeror.
PECL Article 2:202(c) is inspired by the American rules on revo-
cability of subcontractors' bids.2°
3. You shall render the performance you promised
Most contracts provide that one party shall pay a sum of
money for the goods or services it has purchased and the other
party shall deliver the goods or perform the services. If one
party fails to perform, can the other request performance?
a. Monetary obligations
Continental laws allow a creditor to require the perform-
ance of a contractual obligation to pay money. An action for an
agreed sum of money is generally available under the common
law, although it is limited in certain respects and may be
brought only when the price has been "earned" by performance,
see Section 49(1) of the English and Irish Sale of Goods Acts.
Under PECL Article 9:101(1), the creditor can tender his
performance to the other party and then claim the price. The
rule generally applies even if the buyer later discovers that he
does not want performance. In such situations, the buyer of
goods and services must pay the price. However, experience
gained from England and Scotland seems to indicate that there
should be exceptions to the rule. In cases other than the sale of
goods, if a buyer repudiates a contract when the supplier has
not yet performed and the buyer can show that the latter has no
legitimate interest in performing, the supplier's recovery will be
subject to its duty to mitigate its loss and its action is confined
to one for damages. 21 The underlying consideration is that a
debtor should not have to pay for an undesired performance in
cases where the creditor can easily make a cover transaction
and in other cases where it would be unreasonable to oblige the
debtor to pay the price. The latter can occur in construction
contracts in which the contract or part of it has not yet been
performed, and the owner makes it clear that he does not desire
20 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at § 3.25.
21 See Attica Sea Carriers Corp. v. Ferrostaal Poseidon Bulk Carrier Reederei
GmbH, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 250 (C.A. 1976).
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performance and is able to show that the other party has no
legitimate interest in performing.
Many Continental systems have no restrictions on claims
for payment of the price. However, in Belgian law there are a
number of situations where the supplier cannot impose per-
formance upon the buyer and where he can only claim damages
(e.g., in construction contracts, see Article 1794 of the Belgian
Civil Code). Moreover, the supplier cannot insist on perform-
ance when this would be an abuse of a right or otherwise con-
trary to good faith.22
Article 61(2) of the Uniform Law of International Sale of
Goods (1964) (ULIS) provides that a "seller shall not be entitled
to require payment of the price by the buyer if it is in conformity
with usage and reasonably possible for the seller to resell the
goods." In such case, the contract shall be regarded as termi-
nated and the seller may only claim damages. The CISG, how-
ever, has not provided this restriction on the seller's right to
perform and claim the price.
Taking past experiences into account, PECL Article
9:101(2) provides that:
in cases where the creditor has not yet performed its obligation
and it is clear that the debtor will be unwilling to receive perform-
ance, the creditor may nonetheless proceed with its performance
and may recover any sum due under the contract unless:
(a) it could have made a reasonable substitute transaction with-
out significant effort or expense; or
(b) performance would be unreasonable in the circumstances.
The exceptions under (a) and (b) may be regarded as applica-
tions of the principle of proportionality (see infra Section III(D)).
The rule in PECL 9:101(2)(a) has its counterpart in UCC sec-
tion 2-709(1)(b).
b. Non-monetary obligations
With respect to non-monetary obligations, the common law
makes specific performance a discretionary remedy23 based on
22 See Belgian Court of Cassation, Arr. Cass No. 317, RW 1987-88 (January
16, 1986).
23 See GUENTER TREITEL, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 43 (New York
Oxford University Press 1988); U.C.C. § 2.716.
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equity. However, the discretion exercised by the courts is not
completely arbitrary but is subject to rules, one of which is that
such remedy is only granted if compensation for damages would
be inadequate. 24 For this reason, it is granted most frequently
in contracts for the sale of land.
The civil law countries generally recognize the aggrieved
party's right to specific performance. 25 Under German law it is
axiomatic that the aggrieved party has the right to claim per-
formance of the contract and to obtain a judgment ordering the
obligor to fulfill it.26 The right to performance is also empha-
sized in French law, for instance, in Article 1184(2) of the Civil
Code.
The difference between the common law and civil law is im-
portant for dogmatic rather than practical reasons. In the civil
law countries an aggrieved party will pursue an action for spe-
cific performance only if it has a particular interest in perform-
ance that cannot be adequately satisfied by compensation.27
Furthermore, on the Continent as well as in the common law,
specific performance is not available whenever performance has
become impossible or unlawful. 28 Several civil and common law
countries also refuse specific performance in cases where it
would be deemed unreasonable,29 for instance, if the cost of rais-
ing a sunken ship which has been sold would considerably ex-
ceed the value of the ship. In most countries on both sides of
the Channel, performance is not available in contracts for "ser-
vices or work of a personal character."30 Similarly, several coun-
tries refuse performance if it depends on a personal
relationship, for example, an agreement to establish or to con-
tinue a partnership in which the defaulting partner is to play
an active role.3 1
Despite these similar results in practice, the civil and com-
mon law lawyers could not reach an agreement on common
rules when the CISG was drafted. As a result, CISG Article 46
24 See ZWEIGERT and KOTZ, supra note 11, at 480.
25 See id.
26 See id. at 472.
27 See id. at 471.
28 See id. at 472.
29 See id.
30 See ZWEIGERT and KOTz, supra note 11, at 482.
31 See LANDo and BEALE, supra note 3, at 161.
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gives the buyer the right to require performance, and CISG Ar-
ticle 28 provides that:
if, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention [the CISGI
one party is entitled to require performance of any obligation by
the other party, the court is not bound to enter a judgment for
specific performance unless the courtwould do so under its own
law in respect to similar contracts of sale not governed by this
Convention [the CISGI.
Thus, CISG Article 28 preserves the discretion exercised by
common law courts.
This partition was unnecessary. The civil law countries
could have agreed to restrict the right to require specific per-
formance to situations in which such remedy is needed in prac-
tice. The common law countries could have conceded to grant
the aggrieved party the unconditional right to request specific
performance in such situations. 32
Under PECL Article 9:102(1), the aggrieved party is enti-
tled to request the specific performance of a non-monetary obli-
gation, including the remedying of a defective performance.
PECL Article 9:102(2) provides that specific performance can-
not be obtained where:
(a) performance would be unlawful or impossible; or
(b) performance would cause the debtor unreasonable effort or ex-
pense; or
(c) the performance consists in the provision of services or work of
a personal character or depends on a personal relationship; or
(d) the aggrieved party may reasonably obtain performance from
another source.
In regard to the exception under PECL Article 9:102(2)(c),
it is explained in the Comments that a judgment ordering the
performance of personal services or work would be considered a
severe interference with the party's personal freedom. Further-
more, performing such services or work under coercion would
often be unsatisfactory for the creditor. Finally, it would be dif-
ficult for the court to control the enforcement of such an order.
The exception under PECL Article 9:102(2)(d) is the same
as the one provided in PECL Article 9:101(2)(a) and is explained
32 See OLE LANDO, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAw 237, in
(Bianca & Bonell, eds., 1987).
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by the same reasons. This exception and the one under PECL
Article 9:101(2)(b) may be regarded as examples of the applica-
tion of the principle of proportionality (see infra Section
(III)(D)).
The rules on the ways and means of enforcing a judgment
for performance are left to the national legal system. These
rules, however, are different in civil law and common law coun-
tries, thus casting doubt on the wisdom of using the common
law term specific performance in PECL Article 9:102. This term
was used in the absence of a better term that would be gener-
ally understood by all courts.
B. The principle of good faith
1. The general principle
A moral principle accepted by every honorable man and wo-
man is that you shall act in accordance with good faith and fair
dealing. It is related to Kant's categorical imperative: "Your be-
havior shall be governed by such principles as if you were a leg-
islator in a society of reasonable beings obeying common
laws."3 3 It is, however, a question whether the moral command-
ment to act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing
should be elevated to a legal principle. The UCC has done so in
section 1-203. In Europe the views on whether good faith
should have the status of a legal principle differ. This is most
graphically illustrated if one compares German and Dutch law
with the English and Irish common law. The differences, how-
ever, concern the question in general more so than the results
in practice.
Section 242 of the BGB provides that the debtor must per-
form his duty in accordance with good faith, having due regard
for commercial practices. Known as the "King" of the BGB, this
provision has been used to "moralize" the entire German law. 34
It operates as a "super provision" used to modify other statutory
provisions. As such, it has been used to change the rigorous in-
dividualism of the original contract law of the BGB and also
33 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten, Einleitung in der Rechtslehre § C
34 See ZWEIGERT and KOTz, supra note 11, at 150.
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used as a device to adapt the law to changing social and moral
attitudes of society.35
Invoking BGB section 242, the German courts have set
aside unfair contract terms (see infra Section III (B)(2)) and
have created a number of obligations which ensure loyal behav-
ior on the part of the parties.3 6 Some of these obligations are
the duty to cooperate, to take account of the other party's inter-
ests, to provide information and to submit accounts. The courts
have held that a party's right may be limited or lost if enforcing
it would result in the abuse of a right. Clearly, the abuse of a
right may take on many shapes, such as the attempt to acquire
a right through dishonest behavior, to request a performance
that the party would soon have to return, to rely on a behavior
that is inconsistent with one's earlier conduct, or to act contrary
to the principle of proportionality. For example, when termi-
nating a contract or calling a loan because of a trifling breach by
the other party. The principle is open-ended and may impose
new obligations.
Some maintain that BGB section 242 should not lead to
case law where the courts are allowed to disregard provisions of
the contract or rules of law whenever they believe that equity or
fairness so demands. However, in view of the many instances
in which the courts have applied BGB section 242, one gets the
impression of a somewhat undirected case law. Nevertheless,
the idea behind this case law has inspired the German legisla-
ture and has spread to other Continental countries as well.
Dutch law comes close to German law. Article 6:2 of the
Dutch Civil Code of 1992 provides that good faith shall not only
supplement the parties' obligations, but may also modify or ex-
tinguish them. A rule that would bind the parties by virtue of
law, usage or legal act shall not apply if under the circum-
stances this would be unreasonable by the standards of good
faith. Article 6:248 provides a similar rule for contracts.
Article 6:2 of the Dutch Civil Code is an unusual provision.
Since the time of Napoleon, the Code has been regarded as in-
fallible. The Dutch Civil Code now permits the courts to dero-
gate from the Code when it would be deemed unreasonable to
35 See id.
36 See id. at 359.
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follow it. This is something that the courts of all countries have
done now and then, but have never admitted. Having antici-
pated Articles 6:2 and 6:248 of the Dutch Civil Code, the Dutch
courts began establishing a case law even prior to 1992, which
in many respects resembles that of the German courts. 37
Provisions providing for the application of the principle of
good faith in contractual relationships are also found in other
countries of the EU. However, it has not permeated the laws of
these countries as it has in Germany and the Netherlands. In
France it previously played a modest role, but is now considered
a principle in expansion. 38 The courts of the Nordic countries
have recognized the principle of good faith although it has not
been expressed in general terms in the statutes.
In contrast, English common law does not recognize any
general obligation to act in accordance with good faith and fair
dealing.39 However, many of the results achieved in the Conti-
nental systems by requiring good faith have been reached in
English law by more specific rules. For example, a strict moral
code has been imposed in fiduciary relationships, and good faith
is required in contracts characterized as uberrimae fidei. The
duty of good faith is also required when the court is asked to
grant equitable remedies. There are a growing number of cases
where the courts have interpreted the terms of a contract in
such a way as to prevent a party from using a clause in circum-
stances in which it was not intended to be used. New examples
of cases where good faith has been invoked are constantly being
added to English case law.4 0 A foreign observer may ask him-
self when will the selection of examples be sufficiently large to
justify the establishment of a general principle?
On the one hand, a study on Good Faith in European Con-
tract Law, shows no great difference between the laws in the
37 See Netherlands Civil Code, Book 6, The Law of Obligations, Draft Text
and Commentary 73 (Netherlands Ministry of Justice ed., 1977).
38 See MALAuRiE and AyNks, Droit civil. Les obligations, No. 622, (7th ed.,
1997) (Heading: Bonne foi, un principe en expansion); see also TERRA, SIMLER and
Lequette, Droit civil. Les Obligations, No. 414 (6th ed. 1996).
39 See JOSEPH CHITTY, CHITr ON CONTRACTS §§ 1-010, 1-011 (27th ed. 1994,
Second Cumulative Supp. 1997).
40 See id. § 1-011.
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outcome of the cases. 41 The English reports are in line with
those of the majority of the Continental countries. 42 On the
other hand, the courts of England still claim that they do not
recognize any general obligation to act in accordance with good
faith and fair dealing. Thus in 1997 the Privy Council refused
to order specific performance of a contract for the sale of land to
a purchaser who had paid the price ten minutes too late, be-
cause time had been made expressly of the essence for the per-
formance of the contract. The court refused to apply equity to
this situation, and one of the justices, Lord Hoffmann, expressly
rejected the civil law approach to good faith.43 In the view of
the court the predictability of the legal outcome of a case was
more important than absolute justice.44
PECL Article 1:201 now reads as follows: "Each party must
act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing." The formu-
lation is close to that of the UCC section 1-203, which reads
"Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement." However it cov-
ers not only performance, but also the formation, validity and
interpretation of contracts.
Practical applications of this rule appear in several specific
provisions of the PECL. For instance, an offer is irrevocable if
the offeree acted in reliance on the offer; specific performance is
denied if performance would cause the obligor unreasonable ef-
fort and expense (see supra Section III(A)(2)), and a party's duty
to perform its obligation may be modified or the party may be
released when its obligations have become excessively onerous
(see infra Section III(E)(2)). The concept, however, is broader
41 See Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law. The Com-
mon Core of European Private Law, in GoOD FAITH IN EuROPEAN CoNTRACT LAW
653 (Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker eds., 2000).
42 See id. at 655. It appears, however, that the Nordic Countries and Ireland
are more reluctant to apply good faith than the other European countries. They are
small legal jurisdictions. One possible reason for their being out on limb may be
that:
where a legal system by its size tends to engender less litigation there are
fewer occasions on which courts are presented with facts suitable to test
and clarify the application of existing legal rules; and where rules are unt-
ested and uncertain, they either remain untempered or are interpreted in
a cautious (and therefore often more conservative) way.
43 See Union Eagle Ltd. v. Golden Achievement Ltd., [1997] 2 All.E.R 215 at
218.
44 See id.
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than any of these specific applications. Its purpose is to enforce
community standards of decency, fairness and reasonableness
in commercial transactions. It supplements the provisions of
the PECL and it may take precedence over other Principles
when strict adherence to them would lead to a manifestly un-
just result. Thus, even if the non-performance of an obligation
were fundamental because strict compliance with the obligation
is of essence to the contract under PECL Article 9:103(a), a
party would not be permitted to terminate because of a trivial
breach of the obligation (see infra Section III(D)). Good faith is
presumed. The party alleging that the other party has failed to
observe good faith and fair dealing must convince the court.
PECL Article 1:201 will sometimes lead to a conflict be-
tween law and justice. A law or a contract term that is other-
wise valid may, under some circumstances, lead to injustice. As
mentioned above, such conflicts may result in undirected case
law. However, it is not possible to give general guidelines speci-
fying when the court should let the law prevail. That will de-
pend, inter alia, on the extent to which certainty and
predictability in contractual relationships would suffer by let-
ting justice get the upper hand. Thus, strict compliance with
the terms of a contract may be of the essence when the obligor
knows that those responsible for controlling his performance
are able to determine whether there is strict compliance, but
unable to judge the gravity of a non-compliance.
PECL Article 1:201(2) provides that the rule of good faith
and fair dealing is mandatory. The parties may not exclude or
limit their duty to act in accordance with good faith and fair
dealing. However, some of the other articles, where the princi-
ple of good faith and fair dealing is applied, may allow the par-
ties to agree on the terms of their contract. Thus, when making
the contract, the parties may agree on who shall bear the risk of
certain contingencies, and in such cases they will not be covered
by the hardship rule in PECL Article 6:111. Such an agree-
ment, however, is subject to the rules on validity in PECL Arti-
cle 4:109, in situations when a party takes excessive or grossly
unfair advantage of the other party's weak position.
[Vol. 13:339
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2. Unfair terms not individually negotiated
The modern mass production of standardized goods and
services has also brought about standard contracts.45 Stan-
dardized contract terms make individual negotiation unneces-
sary and reduce transaction costs. They are often more detailed
and more suitable for the contract than the implied terms pro-
vided by the law. But standard terms tend to be one sided; one
party (the Stipulator) - often the selling enterprise - imposes its
terms on the other party (the Adhering Party), thereby letting
the Adhering Party carry as many of the risks as possible in the
transaction. For instance, the terms may permit the Stipulator
to raise the price of his performance prior to delivery, hence af-
ter conclusion of the contract. Furthermore, they may require
the Adhering Party to remain bound by the contract while the
Stipulator is permitted to postpone performance beyond the
agreed time, change his performance or even cancel it. There
are exemption clauses that exclude the Stipulator's liability in
cases of his non-performance or exclude or limit the Adhering
Party's right to terminate the contract, as well as clauses that
impose severe penalties on the Adhering Party in case of his
non-performance. The contract may provide that the Stipulator
is not bound by promises and statements made by him or his
agents during the negotiations, unless they have been put down
in writing and signed by the Stipulator.
As the typically weaker party, the consumer is often unable
to understand the written standard terms. For this reason or
due to carelessness, he does not even read them, and if he does,
he does not care. He believes that the Stipulator will stand by
his promise and make a good and conforming tender on time.
Even if the consumer might wish to have the terms changed in
his favor, he cannot avail against the Stipulator. If he would go
to another supplier, the terms would be similar.46
For this reason, many laws now provide special protection
to consumers in their capacity of an Adhering Party to a stan-
dard form contract.4 7 In this respect the Germans have led the
way. Invoking section 242 of the Civil Code, German courts be-
45 See ZWEIGERT and Kowz, supra note 11, at 353.
46 See id.
47 See, e.g., SWEDISH LAWS ON CONSUMER SALES (1974); CONSUMER CREDIT
TRANSACTIONS (1977); CONSUMERS INSURANCE CONTRACTS (1979).
2001]
19
PACE INT'L L. REV.
gan in the 1950s to declare unfair contract clauses unenforce-
able in consumer contracts and business transactions. In 1976
the validity of standard terms was regulated in the General
Conditions of Business Act (German Act), which in many re-
spects consolidated the earlier case law. The German Act sec-
tion 9 provides that general conditions of business are
unenforceable when, contrary to the requirement of good faith,
they cause unreasonable detriment to the Adhering Party.
Furthermore, the German Act section 11 contains a cata-
logue of terms that are to be regarded as invalid per se in con-
tracts with consumers (a black list), and the German Act section
10 is another list of terms that the court may set aside if they
cause unreasonable detriment to the consumer (a gray list).48
Unlike the general clause in the German Act section 9, the two
lists only apply to consumer contracts, not to contracts between
business people.49 However, by virtue of the general clause in
the German Act section 9, the courts can also set aside terms
listed in the catalogues in the German Act sections 10 and 11 in
business contracts, and this has been done to a considerable ex-
tent. In such contracts, the black list in the German Act section
11 is only a gray one. 50
The approach taken by the German Act of 1976 has in sev-
eral respects been adopted by the EU in the EC Directive on
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts.51
In the chapter on the validity of contracts and contract
clauses, PECL Article 4:110 provides rules on unfair contract
terms that in several respects follow those of the Directive.
Similar to Articles 3(1) and 6(1) of the Directive, PECL Article
4:110(1) provides that:
a party may avoid a term that has not been individually negoti-
ated if, contrary to the requirements of good faith and fair deal-
ing, it causes significant imbalance in the parties' rights and
obligations arising under the contract to the detriment of that
party, taking into account the nature of the performance to be
48 See ZWEIGERT and KOTz, supra note 11, at 357.
49 See id.
50 See PALAN'T, BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, §§ 9, 10 and 11 notes (55' ed.
1996).
51 Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29. L 95/29.
[Vol. 13:339
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol13/iss2/4
SALIENT FEATURES
rendered under the contract, all the other terms of the contract
and the circumstances at the time the contract was concluded.
This general clause may be compared with the rule on un-
conscionable contracts and contract terms in UCC section 2-
302, which applies to sales contracts, and with the similar rule
in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 208 that is
meant to cover contracts in general.
The Comment on PECL Article 4:110 refers to a gray list of
17 terms that may be regarded as unfair which have been pro-
vided in an Annex of the Directive.
Unlike the Directive, PECL Article 4:110 is not limited to
contracts between enterprises and consumers. Hence, terms in
contracts concluded between private persons, one of which has
used a standard term, and in contracts between powerful enter-
prises and small businessmen, such as farmers, fishermen, art-
ists, etc. are covered by the provision. All, including the
powerful enterprise are protected. Experience shows that such
a party may also inadvertently subject itself to unfair terms.
PECL Article 4:110 is mandatory. A party cannot waive its
application when the contract is being made. However, it is the
responsibility of the disadvantaged party to take the initiative
to have the clause set aside or modified.
As in Article 4(2) of the Directive, the court cannot assess
whether the main subject matter of the contract or the price is
unfair.52 However, the rules in Chapter 4 of the PECL on "pro-
cedural unfairness" may come to the help of a disadvantaged
party, notably the rules on mistake, misrepresentation, fraud
and on taking excessive or grossly unfair advantage of a party's
weakness. As the case law of several countries shows, the
courts tend to find "procedural" unfairness in cases of unequal
bargaining power and those where there is a gross disparity be-
tween value and price.
Similarly, an individually negotiated contract or a contract
term that proves to be unfair is not covered by PECL Article
4:110, but by the rules on "procedural" unfairness mentioned
above. If these rules cannot help the disadvantaged party and
there is a case of gross unfairness, the general clause on good
52 Compare PECL, supra note 1, art. 4:110(1) (term allowing a party to raise
the price later).
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faith and fair dealing in PECL Article 1:201 can be invoked to
set aside the unfair contract or term.
C. Non-performance and remedies: an attempt to establish a
universal terminology
In the CISG, the term breach of contract is applied for cases
of failure to perform where the obligor carries the risk. This
follows from CISG Article 80 which provides that "a party may
not rely on a failure of the other party to perform to the extent
that such failure was caused by the first party's act or omis-
sion."53 Therefore, when CISG Article 45 provides remedies
that the buyer may exercise "if the seller fails to perform any of
his obligations under the contract of this Convention [CISGI," it
is understood that these remedies cannot be used if the seller's
failure to perform was due to contingencies for which the buyer
carries the risk. Thus, the remedies are not available if a buyer
who purchased goods on FOB conditions does not provide the
ship for carriage of the goods.
In the common law of England and the United States,
breach presupposes liability for damages. Accordingly, there is
no breach unless the aggrieved party would be entitled to claim
damages. Under the CISG, non-performance is applicable in
cases where the aggrieved party has at least one remedy; this
may be damages or another remedy. Most of the remedies spec-
ified in CISG Articles 45 et seq. and CISG Articles 61 et seq.
mention specific performance, termination (called "avoidance"
in the CISG), reduction of the aggrieved party's own perform-
ance, and damages. The party's right to withhold its own per-
formance until the other party performs its obligation is found
in CISG Article 58. This right is not regarded as a remedy for
breach of contract.
The CECL has set up a similar structure and terms for a
future European Code. "Breach" is called non-performance, and
occurs whenever a party fails to perform any of its obligations
under the contract. 54 Non-performance may consist of a defec-
tive performance, failure to provide goods which are free from
53 See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GoODs art. 80 at 627 (2d ed. 1998).
54 See Lando and Beale, supra note 3, at 120 (on non-performance and
remedies).
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any rights and claims of a third party, failure to effect a per-
formance in time, which may be a performance that occurs too
early, too late or never. It also includes the violation of an ac-
cessory duty, such as the duty not to disclose the other party's
trade secrets. Where a party is obliged to receive or accept the
other party's performance, failure to do so also constitutes non-
performance.
The remedies available for non-performance depend on
whether the non-performance is excused. 55 In cases where the
non-performance is not excused, the aggrieved party is entitled
to the right to claim specific performance, to claim damages, to
withhold its own performance, to reduce it or to terminate the
contract. 5
6
If the non-performance is excused, the aggrieved party does
not have the right to claim damages or to require specific per-
formance. However, the other remedies mentioned above may
be available.57 Non-performance is excused if the defaulting
party "proves that it is due to an impediment beyond its control
and that it could not reasonably have been expected to take the
impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the
contract, or to have avoided or overcome the impediment or its
consequences."58 In England and the United States failure to
perform due to frustration or impracticability 59 is functionally
equivalent to what the PECL calls excused non-performance.
D. The principle of proportionality
The principle of proportionality, which is found in many ar-
eas of the law, is a manifestation of the principle of good faith in
that it requires a reasonable relationship between an offense
and its consequences. For example, if the result of non-perform-
ance by a party is not serious, the aggrieved party should not be
permitted to apply a drastic remedy.
55 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 8:101
56 See id. at Chapter 9.
67 See id. art. 8:101(2).
58 Id. art. 8:108(1).
59 See U.C.C. § 2-165.
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1. Termination for fundamental non-performance
Termination releases the aggrieved party from its contrac-
tual obligations. If the contract is terminated before the parties
have performed, they will not be required to perform. If one
party has delivered property that can be returned, and the
other has not, the property will have to be returned and the
other will be released from its duty to perform. If both parties
have received property, they will have to restore it. Accord-
ingly, the buyer must return the goods and the seller must re-
turn the purchase money. In contracts for services, leases and
other contracts of duration, termination will generally only re-
lease the parties from future performance, whereas perform-
ances already rendered will not be affected.
Termination is a remedy with serious consequences for the
parties. A party that has incurred costs by tendering or prepar-
ing performance will often lose its investment in whole or in
part. A party that has relied on goods and services for its enter-
prise may suffer serious losses if it cannot obtain the property
or services, or if it is required to return the property. In inter-
national trade, where performance is often rendered over great
distances, termination will often hit harder than in domestic
trade. For these reasons, many legal systems permit termina-
tion only in cases of a fundamental breach by the defaulting
party.
As specified in PECL Article 8:103, a non-performance of
an obligation is fundamental if:
(a) strict compliance with the obligation is of essence to the
contract;
(b) the non-performance substantially deprives the aggrieved
party of what it was entitled to expect under the contract, unless
the other party did not foresee and could not reasonably have
foreseen the result; or
(c) the non-performance is intentional and gives the aggrieved
party reason to believe that it cannot rely on the other party's
future performance.
PECL Article 9:301(1) provides that a party has the right to ter-
minate the contract if the other party's non-performance is
fundamental.
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The condition laid down in PECL Article 8:103(a) gives the
effect to an agreement between the parties that strict adherence
to the terms of the contract is essential. Any deviation from the
obligation goes to the root of the contract so as to entitle the
other party to be discharged from its obligations under the con-
tract. Thus, if a commercial leasing agreement provides that
the object leased has to be delivered on a certain date, delivery
on that day is of essence to the contract, and any delay will con-
stitute a fundamental non-performance. However, in such
cases the principle of good faith in PECL Article 1:201 (see
supra Section III(B)(1)) can also come into play. If a defect in
delivered goods or another non-performance is so trifling that it
would be unreasonable for the aggrieved party to terminate the
contract, it shall generally not be entitled to do so.
The condition set forth in PECL Article 8:103(b) empha-
sizes the gravity of the consequences of non-performance for the
aggrieved party. It is modeled on CISG Article 25 that contains
the definition of fundamental breach. The case law relating to
CISG Article 2560 will be relevant for the interpretation of
PECL Article 8:103(b).
PECL Article 8:103(c) applies to an intentional non-per-
formance that gives the aggrieved party reason to believe that it
cannot rely on the other party's future performance.
A fundamental non-performance by one of the parties is not
the only ground for termination. It is often difficult to deter-
mine when a delay in performance has lasted long enough to be
deemed a fundamental non-performance. In order to alleviate
this uncertainty, PECL Article 8:106(3) provides that in such
cases, the aggrieved party may send the defaulting party a no-
tice specifying an additional period of time deemed reasonable
for performance. If at the end of that period the defaulting
party has not performed its obligations, the aggrieved party
may terminate.61 In its notice, the aggrieved party can specify
that if the other party does not perform within the designated
period, the contract shall terminate automatically. This Nach-
frist procedure is also found in CISG Articles 47, 49(1)(b), 63
60 See also UNIFORM LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (1964), art. 10
(containing similar text).
61 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 9:301(2).
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and 64 (1)(b). 62 This procedure has its origin in German law. 63
The common law and other legal systems do not provide any
formal procedure of this kind. However, they will often accept
that the aggrieved party, once the date of performance has
passed, can "make time of the essence" by serving a notice on
the defaulting party to perform within a reasonable time. If at
the end of this period, the defaulting party has not performed,
the aggrieved party may then terminate the contract. 64 It is left
to the court to determine which period of time is reasonable
under PECL Article 8:106(3). Regard should be had, inter alia,
for:
(a) the period of time originally set for performance; if it was
short, the additional time can also be short;
(b) the aggrieved party's need for quick performance;
(c) the nature of the performance; a complicated performance
may require longer period of time than a simple one; and
(d) the event that caused the delay, whether it was negligence or
force majeure.
The rules on termination in the UCC are expressed differ-
ently. The perfect tender rule in UCC section 2-601 gives the
buyer a right to terminate "if the goods or the tender of delivery
fail in any respect to conform to the contract." However, as
pointed out by Treitel, the requirement of seriousness of the
breach is re-introduced by a number of other provisions.65
White and Summers claim that the courts' manipulations have
so eroded the perfect tender rule that "the law would be little
changed if § 2-601 gave the right to reject only upon 'substan-
tial' non-conformity."66
2. Other applications of the principle of proportionality
This principle has been applied in cases relating to the spe-
cific performance of monetary and non-monetary obligations. 67
(see supra Section III(A)(3)). A mistake may lead to avoidance
62 See also UNIFORM LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (1964) arts. 27(2)
& 62 (2).
63 See TREITEL, supra note 23, at § 245.
64 See United Scientific Holdings Ltd v. Burnley Borough Council [1978] A.C.
904; Bunge Corp. v.Tradax [1981] 1.W.L.R. 77 (Eng.).
65 See TREITEL, supra note 23, at 269.
66 WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 441 (4th ed., 1995).
67 See PECL, supra note 1, arts. 9:101, 9:102.
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of the contract only if the mistake is fundamental. 6 "A party
who is to perform simultaneously with or after the other party
may withhold its performance until the other has tendered per-
formance or has performed. The first party may withhold the
whole of its performance or a part of it as may be reasonable
under the circumstances." 69 An agreed penalty for non-per-
formance "may be reduced to a reasonable amount where it is
grossly excessive in relation to the loss resulting from the non-
performance and the other circumstances." 70
E. The principle of rebus sic stantibus
This principle operates as a modification of the pacta sunt
servanda principle, (see supra Section III(A)(1)). It gives a total
or partial relief to a party in case of changed circumstances. In
the PECL rebus sic stantibus is found in two rules, one on ex-
cuse due to an impediment (vis major)71 and the other on
changed circumstances (hardship).72
1. Vis major
In most European countries the principle of pacta sunt ser-
vanda prevails even in cases where, after its conclusion, the
contract has become more onerous for one of the parties. The
principle is abandoned only in cases of vis major, which for lack
of a better term is used here to denote supervening events that
make performance impossible or quasi-impossible. In cases of
vis major, the obligor's non-performance is excused.
The rules are not the same in all legal systems. In civil
cases the French doctrine of force majeure has imposed strict
conditions for excusing the obligor, as has the English doctrine
of frustration. 73 Also, in most other legal systems the debtor is
relieved of his obligations only if performance has become im-
68 See id. art. 4:103.
69 Id. art. 9:201(1).
70 Id. art. 9:509.
71 See id. at art. 8:108(1).
72 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 6:111.
73 See ZWEIGERT and Koz, supra note 11, ch. 37 (Fr.); GOODE, supra note 14,
at 139 (Eng.); TREITEL, supra note 14, at 778 (Eng.); RODItRE and TALLON, LES
MODIFICATIONS DU CONTRAT AU COURS DE SON ECtCUTION EN RAISON DE CIRCON-
STANCES NOUVELLES, (Paris 1986) (for a comparative survey of the laws of 8 EC
countries).
20011
27
PACE INT'L L. REV.
possible in law or in fact. Some also accept quasi-impossibility
where performance, though physically possible, cannot be re-
quired because it would be ruinous for most enterprises to per-
form the contract. Some systems are still more lenient, and
relieve the debtor in cases of severe hardship (see supra Section
III(E)(2)).
Under the vis major rule, the debtor is relieved of his obli-
gations if he could not reasonably have been expected to take
the impossibility into account at the time of the conclusion of
the contract, and if the impossibility occurred outside of the con-
trol of the debtor, who is supposed to have control over himself,
as well as internal control over his employees, his equipment
and inventory.
Vis major terminates the contract. There is no room for
modification of its terms and no duty for the parties to renegoti-
ate the contract with a view to such modification.
The vis major rule is not mandatory. The parties may
agree on stricter conditions, for instance, by imposing an abso-
lute obligation on one of the parties, or they may agree on more
lenient conditions. This is often done in standard contract
terms.
Rules similar to the one mentioned above are found in
CISG Article 7974 and in PECL Article 8:108. They do not use
the term impossibility but impediment. The CISG also covers
cases where it would be ruinous for most enterprises to perform
the contract.
2. Hardship
In many business circles the strict pacta sunt servanda rule
is considered too severe. In contracts of duration, such as coop-
eration agreements, lasting construction contracts, or continu-
ous supply of goods or services, unforeseen contingencies can
make performance very onerous for one party, especially in
times of depression or unrest. For such contracts, a hardship
rule more lenient than the vis major rule is needed.
74 See Denis Tallon, Exemption, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAw, supra note 19, at 572 (CISG art. 79); JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 423 (2d ed.
1990); Barry Nicolas, Force Majeure and Frustration, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 231
(1979).
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Hardship clauses are inserted into many contract docu-
ments. However, the parties often forget to insert them or con-
sider them unnecessary. It has been argued that the party who
is then a victim of changed circumstances must bear the conse-
quences of his inadvertence. However, the hardship suffered by
a party is often out of proportion compared to its forgetfulness
or optimism.
Most of the European laws only grant relief in cases of vis
major covering impossibility and quasi impossibility, but some
legal systems relieve the obligor when performance, though not
impossible, has become excessively onerous (Italy: essesiva
onorosite)75 or so different that the economic basis on which the
contract was concluded has disappeared, (Germany: Wegfall der
Geschdftsgrundlage).76 A similar rule is found in Dutch law77
and in French administrative law.7 8 Also, UCC section 2-615
on impracticability will relieve the seller in cases of severe
hardship.7 9
The CISG has no separate provision on hardship. It has
been argued that CISG Article 79, which deals with exemption
in case of impediments, stands somewhere between the very
tough French rule on force majeure governing civil contracts
and the more lenient German rule on Wegfall der
Geschaftsgrundlage.80
As was mentioned above, PECL Article 8:108 contains a
rule similar to CISG Article 79. In addition, PECL Article 6:111
contains a provision on hardship. PECL Article 6:111(1) pro-
vides that a party is bound to fulfill its obligations even if per-
formance has become more onerous due to an increase in the
cost of performance or a reduction in the value of the perform-
ance received. This is a warning to those who believe they can
get out of a contract merely because it has turned out to be
unprofitable.
On the other hand, if performance of the contract has be-
come excessively onerous because of changed circumstances,
75 See CODICE CMIL [C.c] art. 1467 (Italy).
76 See ZWEIGERT and KOTz, supra note 11, at 211.
77 See NIEuw BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [NBW] [Netherlands Civil Code] art. 6:258
(1992).
78 See BARRY NICHOLAS, THE FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 208 (2d ed. 1992).
79 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 66, at §§ 3-10.
80 See HONNOLD, supra note 74, at 542 with reference to authors.
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PECL Article 6:111(2) requires the parties to enter into negotia-
tions with a view to modifying the contract or terminating it,
provided that:
(a) the change of circumstances occurred after the time of conclu-
sion of the contract,8 1
(b) the possibility of a change of circumstances was not one which
could reasonably have been taken into account at the time of con-
clusion of the contract, and
(c) the risk of the change of circumstances is not one which, ac-
cording to the contract, the party affected should be required to
bear.
The hardship rule differs from vis major in the following
respects:
(a) Performance need "only" be excessively onerous, not im-
possible. Thus, hardship occurred when an English water com-
pany, which in the 1920s had undertaken to deliver water at a
fixed price to a hospital for "times ever after," suffered heavy
losses in the eighties when the agreed price had become deri-
sory due to inflation.8 2 Hardship also occurred when a French
gas company, which in 1908 had undertaken to deliver gas to
the citizens of Bordeaux for a period of thirty years at a fixed
tariff, had to continue to deliver gas in World War I when a
severe shortage of coal caused the price of coal used to produce
gas to increase four times.8 3 These cases would probably also be
covered by the rule on impracticability in UCC section 2-615.
(b) The contract is not automatically ended, but may be
modified. Being the best judges of their situation, the parties
must renegotiate the contract in good faith. They may adapt
the contract to the new situation, and, if such adaptation is
pointless, end the contract.
81 See LANDO and BEALE, supra note 3, at 322-323 (The earlier Article 2.117,
(now Art. 6:111 (2)(a)) has been changed by the Second Commission to exclude
cases where the change of circumstance had already occurred at the time the con-
tract was made. These cases are to be governed by the rules on mistake).
82 See Staffordshire Area Health Authority v. South Staffordshire Water-
works Co. [19781 1 W.L.R. 1387 (where the Court of Appeal led by Lord Denning
through an "interpretation" of the words "for times ever after" in a clause fixing the
price of water at 7 pence for a 1000 gallons, which, as he said, could not mean what
they said, decided to raise the price).
83 See NICHOLAS, supra note 78, at 208-209 (Gaz de Bordeaux decision, French
Conseil d'etat [D.P. III] of 30 March 1916 (Sirey 1916.3.17)).
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(c) Where the parties do not reach agreement within a rea-
sonable time, the court or the arbitrator may either terminate
the contract at a time and on terms determined by the court, or
adapt the contract so as to distribute between the parties in a
just and equitable manner the losses and gains resulting from
the change of circumstances. In either case, the court may
award damages to a party for its losses suffered as a result of
the other party's refusal to negotiate or for having broken off
negotiations in bad faith.8 4
84 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 6:111(3).
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